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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 19-24755-SINGHAL
PHILLIP WILLIAMS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BURGER KING CORPORATION,
Defendant.
_____________________________________/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice
in Support of Burger King Corporation’s Motions to (1) Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); and (2) Deny Class Certification Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A) and (d)(1)(D) (“Request for Judicial Notice”) (DE [20]) and the
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint and Deny Class Certification
(“Motion to Dismiss”) (DE [25]). This Court heard oral argument from counsel on June
30, 2020. Having considered the motion, the record, and being otherwise fully advised in
the premises, this Order follows.
I.

BACKGROUND
In the First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) (DE [24]), Plaintiffs Phillip Williams,

William Jones, Michael Roberts, Ali Bey, Christopher McGee, Tiffany Cuthrell, and Marie
Venter (collectively “Plaintiffs”) assert Defendant Burger King Corporation (“BKC”)
“duped” them.

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege they were misled into believing the

“Impossible” plant-based patty in Burger King’s “Impossible Whopper” sandwich, supplied
by Impossible Foods, Inc., would be flame broiled on a different grill than the one used to
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cook beef and chicken. Plaintiffs have since dropped the claim that BKC marketed the
“Impossible Burger” as vegan.
Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint (DE [24]) BKC operates myriad fast food
restaurants across the country and is best known for its “Whopper” burgers made with
beef. (Compl. (DE [24]), ¶ 24). In April 2019, knowing that there is a growing consumer
demand for vegan, vegetarian, and meat-free food options, BKC decided to tap in by
creating its “Impossible Whopper,” with a burger patty made from “Impossible” meats. Id.
at ¶¶ 5, 25. Plaintiffs bring suit against BKC alleging (1) breach of contract (Count I); (2)
violation of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”) (Count II); (3)
violation of New York’s Deceptive Acts or Practices (Count III); (4) violation of New York’s
False Advertising Act (Count IV); (5) violation of California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”)
(Count V); (6) violation of the “Unlawful Prong” of the California Unfair Competition Law
(“UCL”) (Count VI); (7) violation of the “Fraudulent Prong” of the California Unfair
Competition Law (“UCL”) (Count VII); (8) violation of Michigan’s Consumer Protection Act
(“MCPA”) (Count VIII); (9) violation of Georgia’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act (Count IX); and (10) unjust enrichment (Count X).
In the instant motion, BKC argues Plaintiffs do not dispute the “Impossible Burger”
is 100% plant-based and Plaintiffs claims cannot meet the “reasonableness” requirement.
BKC insists its advertising campaign never promised the “Impossible Burger” would be
cooked on a separate surface, and Plaintiffs could not have had an objectively reasonable
belief that it would unless specifically requested by a patron when placing an order.
Plaintiffs admit they did not ask about the cooking method nor did they request an
alternate method of preparation to satisfy their unique dietary requirements.
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BKC also takes exception to the creation of a class, arguing that Plaintiffs cannot
represent a class of all “Impossible Burger” purchasers because each Plaintiff has
different personal preferences, and Plaintiffs fail to plausibly assert that all “Impossible
Burger” purchasers share their stance. Plaintiffs disagree and claim BKC’s misleading
advertising created purchasers where none would have otherwise existed. Plaintiffs also
argue it is too early to consider class certification.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Dismiss
At the pleading stage, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 8(a) does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it does
require “more than labels and conclusions . . . a formulaic recitation of the cause of action
will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To survive a motion
to dismiss, “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level” and must be sufficient “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 555. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court’s review is generally
“limited to the four corners of the complaint.” Wilchombev v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555
F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337
(11th Cir. 2002)). Courts must review the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and it must generally accept the plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts as true. Hishon v.
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d
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1043, 1057 (11th Cir. 2007). However, pleadings that “are no more than conclusions are
not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework
of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
B. Class Certification
“A class action may be maintained only when it satisfies all the requirements of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and at least one of the alternative requirements of Rule 23(b).”
Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1005 (11th Cir. 1997) (footnotes
omitted). Rule 23(a) sets forth the four prerequisites to maintain any claim as a class
action, commonly referred to as: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4)
adequacy of representation. Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir.
2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). If the proposed class satisfies the four factors of
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy, as well as the implicit requirement of
ascertainability, it must then demonstrate entitlement to class relief under one of the three
provisions in Rule 23(b). See Pickett v. Iowa Beef Processors, 209 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th
Cir. 2000). Certifying a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) requires additional findings that
“the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
The burden of satisfying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is on the party seeking class
certification. Hudson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 90 F.3d 451, 456 (11th Cir. 1996).
III.

DISCUSSION
A. Count I – Breach of Contract
“For a breach of contract claim, Florida law requires the plaintiff to plead and

establish: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) a material breach of that contract; and (3)
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damages resulting from the breach.” Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1272
(11th Cir. 2009); see e.g., Friedman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 985 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 4th DCA
2008). “To prove the existence of a contract, a plaintiff must plead: (1) offer; (2)
acceptance; (3) consideration; and (4) sufficient specification of the essential terms.” Id.
(citing St. Joe Corp. v. McIver, 875 So. 2d 375, 381 (Fla. 2004) (citing W.R. Townsend
Contracting, Inc. v. Jensen Civil Constr., Inc., 728 So. 2d 297, 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999))).
Here, the parties agree there is a valid contract. The dispute is based on whether
such contract is express or implied. “An express contract differs from an implied contract
in that “[a]n express contract is one where the intention of the parties and the terms of the
agreement are declared or expressed by the parties, in writing or orally, at the time it is
entered into, while an implied contract is one not created or evidenced by distinct and
explicit language.” Davidson v. Maraj, 609 Fed. Appx. 994, 998 (11th Cir. 2015) (citations
omitted). In this case, Burger King made an offer (the ad for the “Impossible Burger”),
which Plaintiffs accepted (by ordering the “Impossible Burger”), consideration was
exchanged (Plaintiffs’ money for the “Impossible Burger”), and the essential terms were
clear. Thus, this Court must conclude the parties had an express contract.
Plaintiffs’ argument, however, loses momentum when they claim there was a
presumption the “Impossible” patties would be cooked on a different grill than other items
sold at Burger King. This is not an essential term of the contract. Furthermore, as Burger
King’s slogan has boasted for forty years, Plaintiffs’ could have “Had it [their] way” by
requesting a different cooking method, thereby altering the terms of the contract.
B. Count II – FDUTPA
FDUTPA prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or
practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
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commerce.” § 501.204(1), Fla. Stat. A complaint states a FDUTPA cause of action if it
alleges (1) an unfair practice or deceptive act; (2) causation; and (3) actual damages.
See Guerrero v. Target Corp., 889 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2012). Stated
otherwise, the law allows for a plaintiff to recover under FDUTPA if he proves he was
injured “by an objectively deceptive act or statement.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Performance Orthopaedics & Neurosurgery, LLC, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1307, 1316 (S.D. Fla.
2017). Here, Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim is premised on the fact that the “Impossible
Whopper” was cooked on the same grill as meat-containing products. The Complaint
(DE [24]) fails to provide any more specific details regarding the preparation of the
“Impossible Whopper.”
The remainder of Plaintiffs’ consumer fraud claims will be set forth below but
analyzed collectively following section I.

Each claim rests upon the “reasonable

consumer” test also outlined below.
C. Count III – New York’s Deceptive Acts or Practices
New York General Business Law, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 349 makes unlawful
“[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business” and creates a private right
of action under which a litigant may recover actual damages. NY CLS Gen Bus § 349;
see generally Belair Care Ctr., Inc. v. Cool Insuring Agency, Inc., 168 AD3d 1162, 1165–
1166, (2019); Benetech, Inc. v. Omni Fin. Group, Inc., 116 AD3d 1190, 1190–119 (2014).
As a threshold matter, “[a] claim brought under this statute must be predicated on an act
or practice which is consumer-oriented, that is, an act having the potential to affect the
public at large.” Elacqua v. Physicians’ Reciprocal Insurers, 52 AD3d 886, 888, 860
(2008) (citation omitted). “A cause of action to recover damages pursuant to General
Business Law § 349 has three elements: first, that the challenged act or practice was
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consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that the
plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.” Beneficial Homeowner Serv.
Corp. v. Williams, 113 AD3d 713, 714 (2014).
D. Count IV – New York’s False Advertising Act
New York General Business Law, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 350, states “[f]alse
advertising in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any
service in this state is hereby declared unlawful.” NY CLS Gen Bus § 350. To establish
a claim under either section of this law, a plaintiff must show “(i) that the act or practice
was misleading in a material respect, and (ii) that the plaintiff was injured.” Coors Brewing
Co. v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 802 F. Supp. 965, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also McDonald
v. North Shore Yacht Sales, Inc., 513 N.Y.S.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
E. Count V – California’s False Advertising Law
California’s False Advertising Law (FAL), Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq., has
been accurately described as the major California legislation designed to protect
consumers from false or deceptive advertising. See Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v.
Superior Ct., 9 Cal. 5th 279, 305 (2020) (citation omitted). The procedures set forth in
the FAL and in California’s unfair competition law (UCL), Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et
seq., are in many respects parallel to one another, and the UCL specifically provides that
any practice that violates the FAL is also prohibited by the UCL. See Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 17200.

California’s FAL prohibits “not only advertising which is false, but also

advertising which[,] although true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity,
likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.” Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th
939, 951 (2002). Thus, to state a claim under either the UCL or the false advertising law,
based on false advertising or promotional practices, “it is necessary only to show that
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“members of the public are likely to be deceived.” Id. (quoting Leoni v. State Bar, 39
Cal.3d 609, 626 (1985).
F. Count VI – Violation of the “Unlawful Prong” of the California Unfair
Competition Law
The UCL sets out three different kinds of business acts or practices that may
constitute unfair competition: the unlawful, the unfair, and the fraudulent. See Cal. Bus.
Prof. Code § 17500 et seq. A private person has standing to bring an action under the
California Unfair Competition Law, Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq., only if he or she
has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property because of the unfair
competition. Durell v. Sharp Healthcare, 183 Cal. App. 4th 1350, 1360–61 (2010). A
private plaintiff must make a twofold showing: he or she must demonstrate injury in fact,
and a loss of money or property caused by unfair competition. Id. “An unlawful business
practice under [Business and Professions Code] section 17200 is an act or practice,
committed pursuant to business activity, that is at the same time forbidden by law.” Id.
(citations omitted).
G. Count VII – Violation of the “Fraudulent Prong” of the California Unfair
Competition Law
A UCL claim based on the fraudulent prong can be made not only on
representations that deceive because they are untrue, but also those which despite some
level of accuracy still tend to mislead or deceive. “A perfectly true statement couched in
such a manner that it is likely to mislead or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to
disclose other relevant information, is actionable under the UCL.” Morgan v. AT&T
Wireless Servs., Inc., 177 Cal. App. 4th 1235, 1255 (2009) (citations omitted).
H. Count VIII – Michigan’s Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”)
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The Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) prohibits unfair, unconscionable,
or deceptive methods, acts, or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce. See Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.903. “The MCPA is much broader than the common law tort of
fraud, covering not only deceptive practices but also unfair and unconscionable conduct.”
Date v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 2010 WL 3702599 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 16, 2010). It applies only
to purchases by consumers and does not apply to purchases that are primarily for
business purposes. See Nedschroef Detroit Corp. v. Bemas Enters. LLC, 106 F. Supp.
3d 874, 887 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (citations omitted). The MCPA prohibits making an
omission of fact that tends to mislead or deceive any consumer, but only if the omitted
fact could not reasonably be known by that consumer. Zine v. Chrysler Corp., 236 Mich.
App. 261, 283–84 (1999).
I. Count IX – Georgia’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act
The stated intent of the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390
et seq., is to protect the public from acts and practices which are injurious to consumers,
not to provide an additional remedy for private wrongs which do not and could not affect
the consuming public generally. Henderson v. Gandy, 270 Ga. App. 827, 829 (2004)
(citations omitted). The scope of the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. §
10-1-390 et seq., is limited to acts in the conduct of consumer transactions and consumer
acts or practices in trade or commerce. Id. at 829–30. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-392 (a) (3),
defines “consumer acts or practices” as “acts or practices intended to encourage
consumer transactions,” and defines “trade” and “commerce” as “the advertising,
distribution, sale, lease, or offering for distribution, sale, or lease of any goods, services,
or any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal, or mixed, or any other article,
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commodity, or thing of value wherever situated and shall include any trade or commerce
directly or indirectly affecting the people of the state.” OCGA § 10-1-392 (a) (2.1).
PLAINTIFFS’ CONSUMER FRAUD CLAIMS
Plaintiffs’ counts II through IX are governed by the “reasonable consumer” test.
Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
“Under the reasonable consumer standard, [Plaintiffs] must show that members of the
public are likely to be deceived.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838
F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2016). “The Florida Supreme Court has noted that ‘deception
occurs if there is a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the
consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.’” Zlotnick
v. Premier Sales Grp., Inc., 480 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). “This
standard requires a showing of ‘probable, not possible, deception” that is “likely to cause
injury to a reasonable relying consumer.’” Id. (citation omitted); see also Ebner, 838 F.3d
at 965 (requiring more than a mere possibility that Burger King’s advertisement “might
conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers viewing it in an unreasonable
manner.”).
Plaintiffs argue Burger King’s advertisement promised more than a non-meat patty.
Further, Plaintiffs argue it is too early to make such a determination at this stage of the
proceedings. This Court cannot agree. Burger King promised a non-meat patty and
delivered with the “Impossible Burger.”
J. Count X – Unjust Enrichment
“A claim for unjust enrichment is an equitable claim, based on a legal fiction created
by courts to imply a “contract” as a matter of law.” Tooltrend, Inc. v. CMT Utensili, SRL,
198 F.3d 802, 805 (11th Cir. 1999). “Liability in unjust enrichment has in principle nothing
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to do with fault. It has to do with wealth being in one person’s hands when it should be in
another person’s.” Guyana Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Melbourne Int’l Comms., Ltd., 329 F.3d
1241, 1245 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003). The doctrine applies only where (1) the plaintiff conferred
a benefit on the defendant, who had knowledge of the benefit; (2) the defendant
voluntarily accepted and retained the benefit; and (3) under the circumstances, it would
be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it. See Shands
Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Beech St. Corp., 899 So. 2d 1222, 1227 (Fla. 1st DCA
2005).
This Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment with prejudice
because the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties typically
precludes an unjust enrichment claim arising out of a contract. See White Holding Co.,
Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., 423 Fed. Appx. 943, 946 (11th Cir. 2011).
Furthermore, Burger King gave adequate consideration to Plaintiffs for the benefit
conferred (i.e., the “Impossible Whopper” in exchange for the price).
K. Defendant’s Motion to Deny Class Certification
“At an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class
representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a class
action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A).

However, dismissal of class allegations at the

pleading stage “is an extreme remedy appropriate only where a defendant demonstrates
from the face of the complaint that it will be impossible to certify the classes alleged by
the plaintiff regardless of the facts the plaintiff may be able to prove.” Lawson v. Life of
the S. Ins., Co., 286 F.R.D. 689, 695 (M.D. Ga. 2012) (citations omitted). “Failure to prove
any of the four Rule 23(a) requirements and at least one of the alternative requirements
of Rule 23(b) precludes class certification.” Id. at 696 (citations omitted).
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As an initial matter, “[c]onsidering whether questions of law or fact common to
class members predominately begins, of course, with the elements of the underlying
cause of action.” Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions
Fin. Corp., 762 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs argue it is too soon for this
Court to consider whether they satisfy Rule 23. Defendant disagrees and argues Plaintiffs
claims are too individualized to support class certification.

This Court agrees.

Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice in
Support of Burger King Corporation’s Motions to (1) Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); and (2) Deny Class Certification Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A) and (d)(1)(D) (DE [20]) is GRANTED. The Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Second Amended Complaint and Deny Class Certification (DE [25]) is
GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and consumer fraud (Counts I through
IX) are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and Plaintiffs claim for unjust enrichment
(Count X) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Further, as stated on the record, the
Plaintiff’s request for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. Plaintiff may file a motion for leave to amend its complaint by July 27,
2020.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 20th day of
July 2020.

Copies furnished to counsel of record via CM/ECF
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